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aggregate welfare in a two-country model of general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) with 
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coverage, and they also lead to a lower union wage premium in shielded sectors. In contrast, 
the union wage premium in open sectors and aggregate welfare are affected differently by the 
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lowers the union wage premium, and it may also increase welfare. 
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 1 Introduction
There is what appears to be a secular trend towards greater economic integration, but
at the same time sectors that produce non-traded goods, and are therefore exempt from
international competition, still make up an important part of the world economy.1 In this
paper we explore the implications of economic integration in countries where some sectors
of the economy are shielded from international competition, and where the workforce is
partially unionised.
A large theoretical literature suggests that the openness of a sector to international
trade is a key determinant of a union's ability in this sector to negotiate a premium over the
wage workers would get in a perfectly competitive labour market. The standard framework
employed in the literature is the unionised oligopoly model with symmetric countries, and
Srensen (1993) and Huizinga (1993) have shown independently from each other that
in this framework moving from autarky to free trade reduces the union wage premium.
Subsequently Naylor (1998, 1999) has shown that this early theoretical result, while in
line with the public perception that globalisation has a negative eect on labour unions'
ability to set high wages, needs to be qualied. In particular, Naylor has pointed out that
the eect of trade liberalisation on the union wage is non-monotonic: there is a critical
level of trade costs below which unions switch to a low-wage strategy, thereby allowing
the unionised rm to become competitive in the export market. Further incremental
reductions in trade costs lead to an increase in union wages until free trade is reached, at
which point the wage has regained some but not all of its initial loss.2 This suggests that,
1See the evidence provided in De Gregorio et al. (1994) and Bettendorf and Dewachter (2007).
2Munch and Skaksen (2002) allow for the presence of both xed and variable trade costs and show
that the results are sensitive to which of these costs are lowered. Bastos, Kreickemeier and Wright (2009)
modify the symmetric unionised oligopoly model by introducing wage bargaining and open shop unions,
and they show that in this case wages under free trade may be higher than under autarky. There is
also a large literature looking at an asymmetric setup with unions present in only one of the countries,
see Brander and Spencer (1988), and Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991). The asymmetric oligopoly model
has been extended by Lommerud, Meland and Srgard (2003) to allow for FDI, while Straume (2003)
and Lommerud, Straume and Srgard (2006) look at international mergers, and Lommerud, Meland and
Straume (2006) focus on technological change.
2ceteris paribus, the union wage in sectors that are open to international trade is lower
than the union wage in non-traded goods sectors, which are exempt from international
competition.
What is lacking in the theoretical literature just described, but has been a corner stone
in much of the earlier trade literature with perfectly competitive goods and factor markets,
is the general equilibrium link between sectors of traded and non-traded goods induced
by the mobility of workers.3 Similarly, one would expect that for trade unions the general
equilibrium links between traded and non-traded sectors should matter, but how exactly
is not well understood so far. One compelling story about the nature of these links is told
in Moene and Wallerstein (1995). Referring to the Scandinavian tradition of \solidaristic
wage bargaining", whereby union wages were centrally negotiated for both traded and
non-traded sectors, they point out that the desired eect of this arrangement has been to
keep the wages of construction workers, who are mainly employed in non-traded sectors,
low. Due to the lack of international competition in these sectors, prots and therefore
potential wages under decentralised bargaining were high. Since construction workers are
to some extent employed in traded sectors as well, this would have driven up labour cost
in these sectors, and harmed the wage prospects of unionised production workers in the
sectors open to international competition.4
In the present paper, we set up a multi-sector general equilibrium model that also
features traded and non-traded goods, with labour unions present in a subset of both types
of sectors. The presence of non-unionised sectors means that there is an endogenously
determined competitive wage that clears the labour market. The ability of unions to set
wages in organised sectors, whether open or closed to international competition, is aected
by the competitive wage, which provides the outside option for workers and does not
depend on the trading status of the sector in question. The basis for our framework is the
model of general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) by Neary (2009) featuring a continuum
3See Corden and Neary (1982) and Neary (1988).
4See also Rasmussen (1992). In the literature on exchange rate targeting and ination targeting the
co-existence of shielded and non-shielded sectors has also featured prominently, with examples including
Vartiainen (2002), Holden (2003) and Meland (2006).
3of sectors, each of which has a small and exogenous number of rms that compete with
each other in Cournot fashion in an integrated world market.5 In order to bring to the
forefront the role played by unions as well as the distinction between open and shielded
sectors, we eliminate from the model all other asymmetries between sectors. In particular,
we abstract from inter-sectoral dierences in production technologies. In contrast to Neary
(2009) there is therefore no trade based on comparative advantage in our model. Rather,
we follow Brander and Krugman (1983) in assuming segmented markets, which leads to
intra-industry trade in the open sectors for suciently low values of trade costs.6 We
nd that due to the lack of goods market competition, unions in the shielded sectors set
higher wages than unions in the open sectors. In this framework there are two facets of
globalisation. We look at the reduction of trade costs in the open sectors, and also, as in
Falvey and Kreickemeier (2005), at an increase in the proportion of sectors that are open
to international trade. In either case, unionised workers in the shielded sectors do not face
foreign competition directly, but are still aected by general equilibrium eects operating
via the integrated labour market for non-unionised workers.
Two key variables in our analysis are the absolute union wage premia in the shielded
and open sectors, respectively, i.e. the dierences between the union wage in a sector
and the competitive wage. These wage premia govern the dierence in output levels
between unionised and non-unionised rms and the sector level. We show that { perhaps
surprisingly { a reduction of trade costs in open sectors leads to an increase in the union
wage premium in the open sectors, and a decrease in the shielded sectors. As a result,
the share of the workforce employed in unionised rms decreases in the open sectors and
increases in the shielded sectors. In contrast, increasing the share of sectors that are open
to trade reduces the union wage premium in all sectors. In response, the share of workers
5See Neary (2007) for an application to cross-border mergers.
6Similar to us, Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) embed a unionised oligopoly into Neary's GOLE frame-
work. In their model, there is either no trade or trade in all sectors, and hence they cannot analyse the
questions that we are interested in. Another recent extension of the GOLE framework to the case of seg-
mented markets is Bastos and Straume (2010), who analyse the case of endogenous product dierentiation
in the presence of a perfectly competitive labour market.
4employed by unionised rms in all sectors increases. Interestingly, the economy-wide eect
on employment in unionised rms does not depend on the type of trade liberalisation we
consider: at the aggregate level both varieties of freer trade lead to a larger share of the
workforce being unionised. While these results are reminiscent of outcomes one could
expect to get from solidaristic bargaining, in our model they come about as a natural
consequence of globalisation under decentralised wage setting by sector-specic monopoly
unions once general equilibrium eects are properly accounted for.
We also analyze the eects of trade liberalisation on aggregate welfare, which can be
measured in a consistent way by the utility of a representative consumer. We show that
liberalisation in the form of a reduction in marginal trade costs leads to an unambiguous
reduction in aggregate welfare. The welfare eects are potentially more benign when
considering an increase in the number of open sectors. Here, welfare typically increases if
the share of open sectors is already suciently large.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
framework. Section 3 demonstrates how the model is solved in partial equilibrium. Section
4 is the core of the paper, where all important general equilibrium results are derived.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a world of two countries, Home and Foreign, that are identical in all respects.
Due to the assumed symmetry, we can focus on the Home country throughout, in the un-
derstanding that the results hold for the Foreign economy by analogy. Variables pertaining
to the Foreign economy are denoted by an asterisk ().
There is a continuum of sectors indexed by z 2 [0;1], each featuring n rms that
compete in Cournot fashion. The marginal product of labour is identical in all sectors and
normalised to unity. Markets are segmented, as in Brander and Krugman (1983), and if a
good is traded, there is a specic per unit tari . Following Neary (2009), we consider a




















where  is the marginal utility of income, i.e. the Lagrange multiplier attached to the
budget constraint. Substituting for x(z) in the budget constraint gives an expression for













are the rst and second moment, respectively, of the price distribution.
Since each sector constitutes only a marginal part of the economy as a whole, all rms
treat the marginal utility of income parametrically. This implies that perceived inverse
demand functions are linear (see eq. (2)), which is convenient for the discussion of oligopoly
behaviour, and it is a key part of the GOLE framework.
The indirect utility function is derived by substituting for x(z), and subsequently for











7As discussed in Neary (2009), utility function (1) is a special case of the Gorman (1961) polar form. This
property allows for consistent aggregation over individuals with dierent incomes (provided the parameter
b is the same for all). The property furthermore facilitates the normative applications of the model, as
it rationalises the use of the indirect utility function of the single representative consumer to evaluate
aggregate welfare in each country.
6We know that a1  bI is positive, since the marginal utility of income is positive. Hence,
utility is increasing in income and decreasing in the rst moment of prices, as can be
expected. It is also increasing in the second moment of prices: holding the average of
prices constant, a greater variance of prices increases utility.8
Sectors are heterogeneous along two dimensions. The rst dimension refers to the
tradability of goods: A proportion  of sectors produces tradable goods, and we will use
the label \open" when referring to these sectors, although trade occurs in equilibrium
only if the trade cost  is suciently low. The remaining sectors produce goods that are
non-tradable, and we will call those the \shielded" sectors. The second dimension refers
to the labour market characteristics: A proportion  of sectors has wages determined by
unions, while the remaining sectors have fully exible wages and no unions. We assume
that both sector characteristics are uncorrelated. Lastly, and with no loss of generality,
sectors are ordered in such a way that tradable (non-tradable) goods are produced for z 2
[0;) ([;1]), with unionised wage-setting for lower values of z in each interval. Figure 1
illustrates. Due to the assumed complete symmetry between countries, trade in this model
is purely intra-industry.
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Figure 1: Heterogeneity of sectors
8The last result follows from the assumption that preferences are symmetric over goods, combined with
the fact that the indirect utility function is quasi-convex, see e.g. Cornes (1992, pp. 38-41). Intuitively,
consider the example of starting from a symmetric consumption bundle with identical prices, and then
change the prices in any way (necessarily increasing their variance) while leaving nominal income and the
average price constant. The original consumption bundle is still aordable, but it is possible (if preferences
are not Leontief) to increase utility by substituting away from goods that have become relatively more
expensive.
7When modeling the labour market we follow Naylor (1998, 1999) and adopt a monopoly
union framework. In each of the unionised sectors there is a single union, and its objective
is to maximise rents. Firms subsequently choose the level of employment. As in Bastos
and Kreickemeier (2009), each union sets the wage w(z) according to
w(z) = argmax
w
f[w(z)   wc]l(z)g; (5)
where l(z) is the total employment in sector z and wc is the competitive wage. Due to the
assumption of a continuum of sectors, unions are small in the economy as a whole, and
therefore treat wc and  parametrically. If applicable, unions also treat the foreign union
wage parametrically, since wage setting occurs simultaneously in all unionised sectors. As
usual, the game is solved by backwards induction.
3 Partial Equilibrium
In partial equilibrium, all endogenous variables are determined as a function of the com-
petitive wage wc and the marginal utility of income . We look separately at equilibrium
for the shielded and open sectors.
3.1 Shielded sectors
In non-unionised shielded sectors, rm output is given by the standard result for Cournot









with a0  a= and b0  b=. In unionised shielded sectors, the prot maximising output





























In the non-unionised open sectors, we have the standard results from the reciprocal dump-
ing model of Brander and Krugman (1983). Exports occur if and only if  is below a
critical level that is implicitly given by the condition that the eective marginal cost of
serving the export market, wc +, equals the price in this market in the absence of trade,
(a0 + nwc)=(n + 1), which is also the marginal revenue of the exporting rm for the rst
unit sold abroad. For trade costs below this threshold, there is competition between n
domestic rms and n foreign rms, where the latter have higher eective (trade-cost in-
clusive) marginal cost. The prot maximising output levels of Home rms in the domestic
and export market, respectively, are given by
xi(z) =
a0   (n + 1)wc + n[wc + ]
b0(2n + 1)
yi(z) =
a0   (n + 1)[wc + ] + nwc
b0(2n + 1)
;
where xi(z) is output for serving the home market and yi(z) denotes output sold on the
export market. Exploiting the fact that wc = wc in equilibrium due to the assumption
of identical countries, we get:
xi(z) =
a0   wc + n
b0(2n + 1)
yi(z) =
a0   wc   (n + 1)
b0(2n + 1)
(8)
In the unionised sectors, the critical level of taris below which trade occurs cannot be
determined by simply comparing autarky price and marginal cost, since the marginal cost
of serving the export market is partially determined by the union wage, which in turn is
a choice variable of the union. We show in the appendix that a critical  can nevertheless
be determined, and that it is strictly lower than the critical level of trade costs in the
non-unionised sectors. For the moment, let us assume that the actual trade cost is below
this threshold. The equilibrium is then determined in a two stage game, where the rms'
9output choices in the second stage are given by
xi(z) =
a0   (n + 1)w(z) + n[w(z) + ]
b0(2n + 1)
yi(z) =
a0   (n + 1)[w(z) + ] + nw(z)
b0(2n + 1)
;
with union wages w(z) and w(z) determined in the rst stage. The rent-maximising wage










where the term in round brackets is the prot maximising output xi(z)+yi(z) of a domestic
exporting rm. Solving for w(z) gives the domestic union's best reply function:
w(z) =
2[a0 + (n + 1)wc + nw(z)]   
4(n + 1)
There is an analogous best reply function for the foreign union, and due to this symmetry,




2[a0 + (n + 1)wc]   
2(n + 2)
: (9)
Using this equality of the domestic and foreign union wage, prot maximising output levels







t   (n + 1)
b0(2n + 1)
(80)
The dierence between union wages in the shielded and open sectors (provided that trade




n(a0   wc) + 
2(n + 2)
We know from (6) that (a0   wc) is positive, and hence union wages are higher in those
sectors that are shielded from international competition.
4 General Equilibrium
In general equilibrium, we are free in the choice of a numeraire. Following Neary (2009),
it turns out to be particularly convenient to choose marginal utility for this role, which
10implies that all prices are dened relative to the cost of marginal utility, which is given
by  1, the inverse of the marginal utility of income. Wages w=( 1) = w have the
interpretation of real wages at the margin (Neary, 2009), and similarly for prices p. It is




(a2   22); (40)
which shows that utility depends negatively on the second moment of real prices at the
margin, p. This is explained by the fact that the sub-utility for each good is concave, and
hence the representative consumer benets from spreading a given quantity of aggregate
consumption evenly across the dierent goods.9
While aggregate consumption is of course determined in general equilibrium, in our
particular version of the GOLE framework with identical labour input coecients in all
sectors and full employment, the determination is particularly simple: Aggregate output
is constant and equal to L, and hence this must be true for aggregate consumption as
well. Importantly, it follows that the rst moment of prices is constant in our model. This
is so since all perceived inverse demand curves (2) are identical and linear, and therefore
each price increase must be matched one for one by a price decrease elsewhere in order to
keep aggregate demand constant. With a constant average price, (40) implies that utility
is decreasing in the variance of real prices at the margin.
In order to economise on notation and terminology, we now simply set  1  1, and
no longer make explicit the distinction between nominal prices on the one hand and real
prices at the margin on the other hand, in the understanding that in the remainder of
the paper we are always talking about the latter. With the normalisation of  1, general
equilibrium eects between sectors are only transmitted via the competitive wage wc. It
is determined by the condition that aggregate labour demand of all sectors combined be
equal to exogenous labour supply L. This full employment condition in its most general
9Note that this does not contradict the earlier observation that a higher variance of nominal prices in
(4) increases utility for a given nominal income. The distinction reects the dierence between partial and
general equilibrium.





where yi(z) is zero for shielded sector rms. We focus throughout on the case where 
is suciently low for trade to occur in the open sectors z 2 [0;). Using the partial
equilibrium expressions derived above, it is now straightforward to substitute for xi(z)
and yi(z), noting that with the help of (7) and (9) output in unionised sectors can also be
written as a function of the competitive wage. We get




(n + 2)(2n + 1)
n

bL + (n + 2   )

; (10)
where K  (2 )(2n2 +5n+2)+[(2n2 +n 2)+2n+4] > 0. With the competitive
wage thus expressed as a function of model parameters only, it is now possible to nd
closed-form solutions for all the endogenous variables of the model in general equilibrium.
5 Comparative statics
In our framework with traded non-traded goods it is possible to distinguish between glob-
alisation at the intensive margin, modeled as a decrease in trade costs in those sectors
already open to trade, and globalisation at the extensive margin, modeled as an increase
in the proportion of sectors producing tradable goods. We consider both aspects of glob-
alisation in turn.
5.1 The intensive margin of globalisation




2(n + 1)(n + 2   )
K
< 0; (11)
and hence a marginal reduction in trade costs increases the competitive wage. This eect
is explained by the fact that trade liberalisation increases the labour demand of rms in
open sectors, ceteris paribus: For a constant level of wc and wu
t , a reduction in trade costs
leads to lower output for the home market due to increased import competition, but to
12higher output for the export market, since rms become more competitive there. It can be
seen in (8) and (80) that the net eect on labour demand is positive. The increased labour
demand from open sectors meets a constant labour supply, resulting in upward pressure
on the competitive wage.
Using the denition of K, it follows that @2wc=(@@) < 0, which means that the
eect of a change in  on the competitive wage is stronger the larger the proportion of
sectors that produce tradable goods. This is very intuitive: The partial equilibrium eect
on labour demand in each sector is independent of , and with more sectors experiencing
trade liberalisation the eect on aggregate labour demand increases.
The eect of trade liberalisation on the union wage in shielded and open sectors,










































and hence lower trade costs mean that unions in both shielded and open sectors set
higher wages. The rst eect, present in both sectors, results from the general equilibrium
increase in the competitive wage just described, which in the absence of any adjustment
in the union wage would decrease the union wage premium. With a higher competitive
wage the union rent (wu   wc)l is no longer maximised for the original wage-employment
combination, and it becomes optimal for unions to opt for higher wages. In the open
sectors, there is an additional, direct eect known from partial equilibrium models (Naylor
1998, 1999): With higher output due to lower trade cost, the labour demand of unionised
rms becomes less elastic, unions can therefore increase wages at a lower cost in terms of
employment, and this is therefore what they choose to do.
While a trade cost reduction leads to increased union wages in both shielded and open


























13where the inequality sign follows from the fact that @wc=@ >  (1=2) whenever  < 1.
Trade liberalisation therefore leads to a decrease of the union wage premium in shielded
sectors, while the union wage premium in the open sectors increases. In order to see the
economic intuition for this result, consider the counterfactual situation where the unions
increase wages in line with the competitive wage, and hence the union wage premium is
constant. In the shielded sectors, this wage increase would lead to a decrease in employ-
ment, according to (60). In analogy to our earlier argument, with lower employment it
is no longer rent maximising for the union to demand the original wage premium, and
it accepts a lower premium in return for a smaller decrease in employment. In the open
sectors, a constant union wage premium would lead to higher employment due to the
Naylor-eect described above. It is therefore optimal for unions to set yet higher wages,
thereby sacricing part of the employment increase that would otherwise have occurred.
The results are summarised as follows.
Proposition 1. A reduction of trade costs in the open sectors leads to a higher competitive
wage, and to higher union wages in both shielded and open sectors. The absolute union
wage premium falls in shielded sectors and increases in open sectors.
It is instructive to compare this result to a situation where all sectors are open to inter-
national trade, i.e.  = 1, which is the scenario considered in Bastos and Kreickemeier
(2009). In this case trade liberalisation aects all sectors equally, and hence in general
equilibrium all sector-specic employment levels must remain constant. As a consequence
rent maximising unions have no incentive to demand a change the wage premium, and
therefore the competitive wage and the union wage increase by the same extent.10
Comparing (6) to (60) and (8) to (80), respectively, we see that the absolute union wage
premium determines the relative employment of unionised and non-unionised rms both
within the shielded and within the open sectors. An increase in the union wage premium
means that the marginal cost dierence between unionised and non-unionised rms in the
respective sector increases, and therefore the employment dierence between both types
10This is conrmed by (11) and (13), which for  = 1 give the result @w
c=@ = @w
u
t =@ =  (1=2).
14of rms increases as well. Hence it follows from Proposition 1 that in the shielded sectors
the relative employment in unionised rms goes up, while in the open sectors it goes down.
In order to gauge the eect of trade liberalisation on the overall share of the workforce
employed in unionised rms, one has to aggregate these sector-specic eects, and fur-
thermore take into account that the share of the workforce employed in shielded sectors,
Ls=L, changes as trade costs are lowered. Formally, the latter eect can be derived by




n(1   )(2   )(a   wc)
2(n + 1)bL
:
Since the competitive wage increases in the course of trade liberalisation, as shown above
in eq. (11), there is a reallocation of workers towards the open sectors when trade costs fall.
Taking these general equilibrium eects into account, we are able to show the following:
Proposition 2. The proportion of workers employed in unionised rms increases as trade
costs in open sectors are reduced.
Proof. See the appendix.
This result tells us that globalisation need not be { as suggested by views held by the
general public { detrimental to union coverage, quite the opposite. In our setting with
symmetric countries, in principle this should not come as a surprise: after all, a reduction
in trade costs is not only { in the form of import competition { a threat to unionised
workers and the rms employing them, but also an opportunity due to the improved
competitiveness in export markets. However, as shown earlier, rent maximising unions
in the open sectors opt for wage increases, thereby sacricing increases in the number of
employed workers, and the aggregate gain in union coverage is the result of relative wage
restraint exercised by unions in the shielded sectors, who are the high-wage earners to
begin with. Notably, what could appear to be wage solidarity among unionised workers in
the face of globalisation, in our model comes about not because of solidaristic bargaining,
but as a natural consequence of trade liberalisation under decentralised wage setting by
unions at the sector level once general equilibrium eects are properly accounted for.
15We now turn to the welfare analysis of trade liberalisation. Aggregate welfare is mea-
sured by the utility of the representative individual, and as argued earlier it only depends
on the variance of prices. Since, as we have just shown, the relative output of shielded sec-
tors decreases, relative prices of the non-traded goods increase. Since these are the higher
prices to begin with, the variance of prices increases. We therefore get the following result:
Proposition 3. A reduction in trade costs in open sectors reduces welfare.
Proof. See the appendix.
That welfare unambiguously falls as a consequence of a reduction in marginal trade costs
stands in marked contrast to the result derived in the tradable-goods-only framework of
Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009), who nd that trade liberalisation has no eect on welfare.
In their case, since trade liberalisation aects all sectors equally and prices stay the same
as a consequence, the consumption levels of all goods are unchanged. In our model, with
high prices rising and low prices falling, consumption levels across goods become more
unequal. Since overall output is constant, this reduces welfare due to the concavity of the
utility function.
5.2 The extensive margin of globalisation
Trade cost reductions in sectors already open to trade are only one facet of globalisation.
In our framework, which features the co-existence of open and shielded sectors, we can look
at a piecemeal increase in the proportion of sectors that are open to trade, which amounts
to liberalisation along the extensive margin of globalisation. This case is fundamentally
dierent from liberalisation at the intensive margin considered so far, since all partial
equilibrium eects are now eliminated: Both wu
n and wu
t are only aected via the change
in the competitive wage. In addition, there is of course a direct wage eect in those sectors
that change their trade status. We show the following results:
Proposition 4. Increasing the proportion of sectors open to trade increases the compet-
itive wage as well as the union wage in both open and shielded sectors. The union wage
16premium in all sectors decreases, while the fraction of the workforce employed in unionised
rms increases.


























Lastly, @(Lu=L)=@ > 0 is shown in the appendix.
Intuitively, for a given value of wc; output { and therefore labour demand { increases in
those sectors that become open to trade, resulting in upward pressure on the competitive
wage. Union wages increase, but union wage premia decrease in all sectors, leading to a
shift in employment towards unionised rms.11 Thus, as in the case of globalisation at the
intensive margin, globalisation at the extensive margin does not weaken union coverage,
quite the opposite.
Welfare eects can again be inferred from changes in the variance of prices. Bastos and
Kreickemeier (2009) have shown that welfare is higher with free trade in all sectors than
in autarky, which is due to the reallocation of workers towards unionised rms, a decrease
in the relative price charged by those rms, and the resulting decrease in the variance of















We cannot use this simple intuition for the analysis of an incremental increase in  con-
sidered here since at intermediate levels of  there are now four prices to consider, rather
than just two at a time as in (16). All four prices increase with higher  due to the increase





t ) is increased, leaving the average constant. It is clear from
Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) that the welfare eect of marginally increasing  must be
11Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) compare wages and wage premia in autarky to those in a situation
with trade in all sectors, which in our current framework would amount to comparing the polar cases  = 0
and  = 1. The results are as in Proposition 4, as they must be, since we have shown that a change in 
has a monotonic eect on wages and wage premia.
17positive for at least some ranges of , since going all the way from autarky to free trade
increases welfare. We can in fact show the following:
Proposition 5. An incremental increase in the proportion of open sectors increases wel-
fare if this proportion is already suciently high, but may decrease welfare otherwise.
Proof. See the appendix.
Incremental globalisation along the extensive margin is therefore potentially favourable
from a welfare point of view, in contrast to globalisation along the intensive margin, and
this is denitely the case if the economy is already suciently open.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we study the eects of globalisation on labour markets and welfare when
some sectors are shielded from international competition. Wage setting monopoly unions
are a feature of the labour market in a subset of sectors, and we analyse the dierential
impact that unionisation has on wages, depending on whether the sectors in question are
open to international trade or not. By highlighting the importance of a sector's exposure to
international trade for union wages, our setup is reminiscent of the literature on solidaristic
bargaining in open economies, but unions in our framework do not coordinate their wage
policies across sector boundaries. We consider two forms of globalisation { a reduction in
marginal trade cost, and an increase in the number of sectors open to trade { and nd
that both increase union coverage, and they also lead to a lower union wage premium
in shielded sectors. In contrast, the union wage premium in open sectors and aggregate
welfare are aected dierently by the two types of globalisation. Trade cost reductions
in open sectors always lead to higher union wage premia and to lower aggregate welfare,
while an increased number of open sectors lowers the union wage premium, and it will
denitely increase welfare if the degree of openness is already suciently high.
18Appendix
Threshold level of trade costs
For two-way trade to be an equilibrium in all sectors, we check here that unions in one
country (home) will not want to deviate from an exporting strategy and choose a discretely
higher wage, inducing the rms to stop exporting (see also Naylor, 1998, 1999, Lommerud,
Meland and Srgard, 2003 and Bastos and Kreickemeier, 2009). For simplicity, we set
 = 1: Also, the z-notation is dropped.









2 b(2n + 1)
;
which is decreasing in  (also when taking equilibrium eects through wc into account).
Thus as trade costs increase, the utility of the union falls.
Alternatively, the union could choose a higher wage inducing only imports, and opti-
mally set, this wage would be
wdev = argmax
w (w   wc)n







a + n(w + ) + (n + 1)wc
(n + 1)
;
where w is the wage of the foreign union. Given that the union in the foreign country
chooses the equilibrium wage w =
2a+2wc(n+1) 




(4(n + 1)(a   wc) + n(3 + 2n))
2
(n + 2)
2 (2n + 1)b(n + 1)
;
which is increasing in  (again, also when taking equilibrium eects into account). Thus
the incentive to deviate is higher for higher trade costs, because then both the deviation
utility increases and the non-deviation utility becomes lower. The union is indierent
between deviating and not when Ru
t = Rdev; or for











4 + 3n + 2n2
(2   )+n(6+(2n 1))+2
p
2(1   )(2   )(n + 1) > 0:
For  < ; the union will not want to deviate, and we can conclude that there will exist
19an equilibrium in the wage setting game where there is two-way trade in the unionised
sectors.
For the non-union open sector, there will be trade if
y = n
a   (wc + t(n + 1))
(2n + 1)b
> 0:
Solving for ; this gives us




(2   )(2 + n) + n
: (17)
This is a less strict condition than the above restriction calculated for the unionised open
sector, so  <  is sucient for two way trade to occur in both unionised and non-
unionised sectors. We will thus assume that  < : However, wherever it suces to use
 <  in a proof and it simplies the expressions, we will use that instead.
Proof of Proposition 2




 (n + 1)
2a (2wc+)









2(n2 + 1)(1 + ) + n(5 + 3)

bL   (1   )(1   )n2
KbL
;
where K > 0 is dened in Section 4. It is now immediate that
@(Lu=L)
@  0, where the
inequality is strict if 0 <  < 1 and  < 1.
Proof of Proposition 3




t )2 + (1   )(pn
t )2
+ (1   )

(pu
n)2 + (1   )(pn
n)2
;
and this can be written as
2 =a(a   2bL) +
(1   )(4   3)
K2

(n + 2)(2n + 1)bL + (n + 2   )n
2
+ 
(n + 2)2   (2n + 3)
K2
















2(1   )n2 ( + n)bL




@  0; where the inequality is strict unless  = 0 or  = 1:
Proof of Proposition 4
Partially dierentiating wc with respect to  leads to:
@wc
@
= 2(n + 1)(n + 2)(2n + 1)
 
2n2 + 4   2 + n + 2n

bL   (2   )(n + 2   )n
nK2










2bL(2n + 1)(n + 2)(n + 1)
K (n + (2   )(n + 2))
> 0:
For the fraction of workers in the unionised sectors, we have
@(Lu=L)
@




(2+n)(2n+1)   (1   )(2   )
i
+ 4(n + 1)bL
bLK2 :
For  = 0; @(Lu=L)=@ > 0: Thus an increase in the number of open sectors also leads
to higher total employment in unionised rms. This can only change with higher  if
K
(2+n)(2n+1)   (1   )(2   ) < 0; which happens for low . Assuming K
(2+n)(2n+1)   (1  
)(2   ) < 0; and using the fact that
@2(Lu=L)










2(n + 2)(1 +  + 2n)n(1   )
K((2   )(n + 2) + n)
 0:
Thus, @(Lu=L)=@  0, and it is exactly equal to zero only if  = 0 or  = 1.
Proof of Proposition 5






































(n + 2   )
2 (n + 1)
> 0:
























n2 + n(6   5) + 8(1   )
(n + 2   )
3 < 0:
By continuity, there is also a range of   1 near  = 1 where
@2
@ < 0:
To illustrate that both
@2
@ > 0 and
@2
@ < 0 can happen for lower levels of ; let for
instance  = 0 and n = 2: Evaluating
@2













which is negative for  2 (1
3; 1
2) and positive otherwise. (It is also easy to show that for
 = 1 and  = 0;
@2
@ j=0 is always positive.)
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